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Abstract 
Regulatory standards protect consumers from defective products, but they impede trade when they 
differ across countries. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) seeks to reduce 
distortions in the automobile and other industries. This paper evaluates the equivalence of automobile 
regulations in the United States and the European Union in terms of catastrophe avoidance and 
estimates the trade gains from improved regulatory coherence. The UN 1958 Agreement on 
automobiles, which offers a framework for harmonizing regulations among signatories, is used to 
quantify the trade effect of regulatory convergence. The removal of regulatory differences in autos is 
estimated to increase trade by 20 percent or more. The effect on trade from harmonizing standards is 
only slightly smaller than the effect of EU accession on auto trade. The large economic gains from 
regulatory harmonization imply that TTIP has the potential to improve productivity while lowering 
prices and enhancing variety for consumers. 
Keywords: 
Regulatory harmonization, difference-in-differences, trade agreement  
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1. Introduction* 
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) aims at harmonizing regulations across the 
European Union and the United States. The European Commission states TTIP’s objective as 
achieving “greater regulatory compatibility between the EU and the US, and paving the way for 
setting global standards.” The US Trade Representative says “T-TIP can set high standards and 
pioneer new rules for the global trading system.”1  
This Paper focuses on the gains that both partners could reap from regulatory coherence in the 
automobile industry, using the trade effects of the 1958 Agreement—the most comprehensive 
agreement on technical prescriptions for automobiles to date—as an event study. The 1958 Agreement 
establishes a set of uniform standards for vehicles and their components relating to safety, 
environment, energy, and antitheft requirements. The European Union, as well as Japan and Korea 
among others, are parties to the agreement. The United States, however, has its own safety standards 
and is not a contracting party to the 1958 Agreement.  
Given the feasibility of regulatory harmonization (as evidenced by the 1958 Agreement), the auto 
industry stands out as a critical test case in the TTIP for improving regulatory coherence between the 
United States and the European Union. Both maintain vastly different regulations as well as different 
ways of administering them. Despite disparities in regulations and hence production requirements, we 
show that these regulatory regimes are not significantly different in terms of the safety outcomes they 
deliver.  
The regulatory divergence distorts the market, raising production costs, encouraging price 
discrimination across markets, and limiting the available import varieties. To measure the trade loss 
from having two sets of regulations, the Paper examines how the 1958 Agreement affects trade, using 
a difference-in-differences approach. The advantage of our methodology is that it uses an actual case 
of regulatory harmonization (accession to the 1958 Agreement) in the same industry to estimate the 
effect of regulatory convergence. Because of variation in dates of members’ accession, we can control 
for exporter-year specific effects, importer-year effects, country-pair effects, as well as other bilateral 
time-varying events such as EU accession or voluntary export restraints. In contrast, other studies have 
estimated trade gains from regulatory harmonization using an ad valorem tariff equivalent of 
regulatory differences. Regulatory convergence could have very different effects from tariffs because 
adhering to two distinct regulatory frameworks affects a company’s production structure, lowering 
both variable and fixed costs. 
We find that joining the 1958 Agreement boosts auto trade by more than 20 percent. This effect is 
significantly higher than effects estimated using tariff equivalents and almost as large as the additional 
increase from joining the European Union. The results are robust to different periods, different 
samples, and controlling for EU accession, high market share exporters, and for voluntary export 
restraints that were in effect over the period, as well as potential endogeneity of the agreement. We 
further show that foreign direct investment has not already segmented markets to such a degree that it 
would limit the medium-run trade gains from regulatory convergence. 
Achieving regulatory harmonization or mutual recognition of regulations now would help US and 
EU producers benefit from scale economies and compete in the global marketplace, while providing 
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consumers with more varieties within a market and equivalent safety at lower prices. More broadly, 
the TTIP agreement is about both market integration and first-mover advantage. Simply put, by 
harmonizing regulations in some industries or agreeing to recognize each other’s regulations, 
replication in production could be avoided, generating real productivity gains. Moreover, as the largest 
combined market for many products, the rest of the world will be very likely to follow similar rules. 
2. The Equivalence of Regulations 
Regulatory standards ensure that products are safe for consumers and do not excessively damage the 
environment. The EU and US safety and environmental regulations are both relatively high and well 
enforced, but have different requirements. This section focuses on safety regulations because although 
environmental standards also differ, they are less distortionary from an economic perspective. While 
there are barriers to harmonizing environmental regulations, notably in the driving pattern required 
during testing (including distance, speed, and whether the car is allowed to warm up before testing 
begins), there is also room from a manufacturing perspective to create one model for both markets that 
adheres to the most stringent emissions regulation. For example, the European Union is moving 
toward a greenhouse gas emissions standard of 95 grams/kilometer (60.6 miles per gallon equivalent) 
for 95 percent of vehicles by 2020 and the United States is moving toward an average level of 163 
grams/mile (54.5 miles per gallon equivalent) by 2025. It may be in the producer’s interest to make 
one car for both markets that meets the 60.6 miles per gallon threshold.
2
 A clear hierarchy in these 
regulations favors low emissions. As a result, environmental regulations can create a race to the top, 
where an automobile that meets the highest standard on various emissions tests is marketable in both 
economies. In contrast, safety requirements are more complex and often incompatible in the sense that 
one car cannot meet both regulations simultaneously. 
The US and EU models of the 2014 Ford Fusion have 80 percent of the same parts, which is higher 
than the industry average for overlapping parts,
3
 yet a fifth of the Fusion’s parts need to be 
manufactured separately for the two markets. Some of the parts are different because of testing 
regulations, while other differences lie in specific parts. For example, both markets require crash 
testing but the tests are distinct, in both speed of the car and rigidness of the barrier. US standards are 
tougher because cars must satisfy certain criteria even accounting for passengers not wearing seatbelts. 
Other parts that are different are individually small, such as the color of the tail light or the presence of 
side lights (only the United States requires them)—but these add up.  
To demonstrate the technical differences in a single part, table 1 shows the differences in regulatory 
standards between US and EU lighting systems for automobiles, in particular side turn signal lamps. 
The first column lists the technical regulation in the European Union, column 2 is the corresponding 
US regulation, and column 3 explains the differences, if any, between the two regulations. In many 
cases, an EU manufacturer can clearly comply with US regulations, such as the height of the front 
lights, which has a lower minimum in the European Union. In other cases, there is no overlap, such as 
the front light color. This extensive table only addresses one specific light system.  
Ultimately, what matters is the outcome of the requirements: Are passengers safe in vehicles 
meeting European or US regulations? To answer this question, we compare auto fatality data across 
countries. Figure 1a shows fatalities per 100,000 vehicles across EU countries. Figure 1b shows the 
same across US states. The EU rates are very similar to US rates, with 15.8 fatalities per 100,000 
vehicles in the European Union versus 13.6 fatalities in the United States. Figure 1c shows fatality 
rates and GDP per capita of the individual EU countries and US states, indicating that rates vary far 
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more with stage of development than with auto regulations, which are largely the same within Europe 
and the United States. This suggests that country-specific variables, such as age of the fleet on the 
road, quality of roads, terrain, weather, and enforcement of laws are far more important in safety than 
regulation of the vehicles. 
To test whether fatalities per motor vehicle are fewer in the United States or the European Union, 
we regress the fatality rate on an indicator variable for the European Union—this variable takes the 
value 1 for EU members and zero otherwise. If the United States and the European Union have 
different safety regulations, the EU dummy should be negative and significant if the European Union 
is safer, and positive and significant if the European Union is more dangerous. The results, reported in 
table 2, show no significant difference across EU countries and US states. Next, we control for GDP 
per capita. The point estimate on lnGDP is negative and highly significant; suggesting that a 10 
percent increase in GDP per capita saves 2 to 3 lives per 100,000 vehicles. The third column measures 
fatalities in logs and results remain similar, though in this case the interpretation is slightly different. 
The results show that a 1 percent increase in per capita income reduces fatalities by more than 1 
percent. In both specifications, per capita income explains more than 50 percent of the variation in 
fatality rates across countries. The coefficient on the EU variable remains insignificant in all 
specifications, and is very small when income is included in the regression, suggesting that auto safety 
in EU countries is not statistically different from US states. 
3. Economic Benefits: Evidence from the 1958 Agreement 
The economic argument against different regulations is that instead of making one model for both 
markets, car producers make two separate models. Returns to scale are underutilized, some processes 
are duplicated, producers can price discriminate, and inventory cannot be reallocated across markets. 
As a result, consumers face higher average prices and less variety. 
Regulatory barriers are especially burdensome for small producers or in small markets. Some 
models are not sold in markets where there is demand because sunk costs of adjusting the models to 
those markets are too high. For example, while the Canadian market adheres to US regulations, 
demand for subcompact and compact cars is higher in Canada than in the United States (representing 
65 and 41 percent of market share, respectively). European manufacturers are unable to take advantage 
of this demand for smaller cars in Canada, because as Canadian car sales were less than 5 percent of 
US auto sales in 2014, the sunk cost of adjusting a subcompact European car to US regulations (in 
order to sell in the Canadian market) is higher than the relative gains in the Canadian market.
4
  
Regulatory differences also affect consumers: When there is demand for the same car in both 
markets, consumers may not be able to take advantage of price differentials across markets due to the 
cost of recertification in the new market. This allows producers to price discriminate, selling a 
Mercedes for the profit-maximizing price in each market, which leads to higher average prices.
5
  
Regulatory differences also impede market integration, preventing companies from selling new 
products in both markets. For example, if a specific new technology is approved under European 
regulations, such as Mercedes-Benz LED Intelligent Light System, but not under US regulations, the 
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new technology is not available for sale in the United States. US consumers thus cannot enjoy the new 
technology because markets are not integrated.  
Increased integration of markets promotes rapid innovation. Previous work on auto emissions 
regulations shows that convergence of regulation leads to increased technology transfer and motivates 
export-oriented car industries in smaller countries to adopt higher emissions regulations to converge 
with the US and EU markets, creating a race to the top. Using data on automobile emissions 
regulations between 1992 and 2007, Antoine Dechezleprêtre, Eric Neumayer, and Richard Perkins 
(2015) find that technological developments, measured as cross-border patents, are more likely to flow 
between countries where regulatory standards are similar, rather than the level of regulations 
themselves. Perkins and Neumayer (2012) find that small and developing countries with export-
oriented auto industries are more likely to have stricter auto emissions regulations and their auto 
sectors receive higher levels of inward foreign direct investment (FDI). The authors argue that export-
oriented firms whose main target markets include countries with higher emissions standards have an 
incentive to raise standards in their home markets since these firms already have the infrastructure in 
place to produce higher-standard vehicles and therefore would be more competitive than strictly 
domestic producers. Better regulatory coherence will also promote research and development because 
instead of spending on adapting models to different regulatory regimes, companies will channel 
resources toward finding safer and more fuel efficient technologies. 
While an increasing number of countries have adopted the UN Regulations associated with the 
1958 Agreement, some such as Chile (and some small countries) follow US regulations. Regulatory 
convergence will not only help the US and EU markets but also may draw smaller countries into their 
standardized framework, thus spreading the high standards.  
Quantifying the Gains from Integration of Regulations 
To estimate the gains from having a single market, we use data on trade to evaluate the effect of 
becoming a contracting party to the 1958 Agreement. Along with its subsequent revisions in 1967 and 
1995, the 1958 Agreement has gone a long way towards completely harmonizing regulatory standards.
 
6
 Individual governments and governing bodies (such as the European Union) that are parties to the 
agreement verify that automobiles meet the regulations before they are certified for sale to consumers. 
The agreement was made under the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) and 
originally allowed participation only by UNECE members, but since 1995 has accepted non-European 
members, such as Japan (1998) and South Korea (2004). Table 3 lists the countries that are currently 
contracting parties to the 1958 agreement, by order of accession date. 
The variation in accession dates helps to isolate the effect on auto trade of signing the 1958 
Agreement. Figure 2 shows the average and median of the log of real exports versus time relative to 
accession year. Year 0 is the year a country joined the agreement, year 1 is the year after, year –1 is 
the year before and so forth. The figure shows that after joining the agreement countries tend to 
increase exports with members, from a similar starting level. The graph is in logs indicating that 
member exports doubled around accession and exports of non-members remained unchanged. Figure 3 
shows that joining the agreement leads to a shift in exports to other agreement members. Both show a 
clear effect of the agreement on trade flows between contracting parties. 
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Estimating the Magnitude of the UN58 Effect 
To estimate the size of the effect, controlling for supply and demand shocks to trade, we use a 
difference-in-differences approach. The difference-in-differences approach allows for a near 
experimental research design. While ideally we would like to randomly assign some countries the 
same regulatory standards and then observe what happens to auto trade, this type of experimental 
research design is obviously not feasible. This methodology is as close as you can get to experimental 
design using data. It compares trade growth between a new member and an existing member to trade 
growth between the new member and an otherwise similar country that is not a member.  
In particular, we use the following regression equation on exports from country i to country j in 
year t (exportsijt): 
 
 (1) ln⁡(𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠)𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑗𝑡 ++𝛾𝑖𝑗 + 𝑈𝑁58𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡, 
where US58 is a dummy for two countries being members of the 1958 agreement, γit is an exporter-
year fixed effect, γjt is an importer-year fixed effect, and γij is an country-pair fixed effect, and the 
final term is the error. When Greece joined the agreement in 1992 the UN58 variable switched from 0 
to 1, on bilateral trade flows with another agreement member. The variable remains 1 when trade is 
between Greece and other agreement members for all subsequent years that Greece is a member of the 
agreement.  
We also include a dummy for the European Union to ensure that UN58 does not pick up EU 
effects, as a number of countries that joined the 1958 Agreement also joined the European Union over 
the period. The EU dummy is one for the year of accession and all years after for trade between the 
new member and other EU members, and zero otherwise.
7
  
Data are from UN Comtrade for trade in passenger cars (SITC 7321) and include total value of 
bilateral exports for all country pairs. Data are drawn as mirror import data, which is better reported, 
and range from 1970 to 2013, over which period 41 countries acceded to the agreement. Because of 
the large number of fixed effects, we cannot estimate the regression on the full sample. We include all 
exporters that exported an aggregate of $1 million in automobiles in at least one year of the sample, 
and all importers that imported at least $1 million in one year. These countries account for on average 
97 percent of total auto trade over the period.
8
 Errors are clustered at the country-pair level, consistent 
with our variable of interest.
9 
The advantage of this approach is that importer-year fixed effects control for demand shocks, for 
example, because of a rise in income or a change in most-favored nation (MFN) tariffs. Exporter-year 
fixed effects pick up supply shocks, such as a productivity boost. The country-pair fixed effect 
controls for average trade between two countries and picks up non-time-varying factors, such as 
distance, common language, and other static linkages, such as the pair’s membership in the European 
Union over the whole period. The variable of interest, UN58, picks up the long-run effect on annual 
bilateral trade flows between members from signing the agreement. 
The results are reported in table 4. The first column reports results with only the UN58 variable, the 
coefficient of 0.21 implies a trade effect of the agreement of 23 percent (exp(.21)-1). The next column 
repeats the exercise including the EU dummy in the regression and the result remains unchanged.  
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 This yields 35 exporters, listed in appendix table A.1, and 69 importers. In the robustness section we also split the period 
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9
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The effect on auto trade of joining the 1958 Agreement is large and significant but smaller than the 
effect of EU accession. The EU membership effect is more important in this sector because the auto 
sector relies on distribution and service, and over our sample period relatively high tariffs and other 
regulations were limiting cross-border auto trade. The EU coefficient found here is comparable to 
estimates of the gains to trade associated with EU membership in manufacturing sectors.
10
  
A potential concern about our methodology is that joining the 1958 Agreement might be 
endogenous. Countries that have increasing auto trade with agreement members might be more likely 
to join the agreement. This could overestimate the effect of the agreement on trade. To some extent the 
exporter-year and importer-year effects should pick this up, as they control for countries that become 
increasingly involved in auto trade over time. But if the effect is group-specific they may not.  
In the absence of a good instrument for joining the agreement, we exploit an additional feature of 
the data to control for potential endogeneity. In ten countries in the 1958 Agreement, people drive on 
the left side of the road.
11
 For trade between these countries and the rest, the agreement should be less 
effective because inventory cannot be redeployed across markets and two separate models still need to 
be created. It is impossible for regulations to be the same when an important feature such as the 
steering side of the car is different, which results in differences in dashboards, mirrors, pedals, stick 
shift, etc. We thus create a dummy for trade between a left-hand driving country and a right-hand 
driving country. We interact this dummy with the UN58 variable and include the interaction in the 
regression (country-pair fixed effects eliminate the need to include the dummy itself). If the effect of 
the agreement is about trends among members, we expect the interaction effect to be insignificant. If it 
is about regulatory convergence, we expect the variable to be negative and significant, indicating that 
these country pairs do not experience the full effect of the agreement. The result is shown in the third 
column of table 4. The negative and significant effect of the interaction shows that the agreement has 
no effect on trade between left-hand and right-hand driving countries. In addition, controlling for the 
mixed pairs, the overall effect of the agreement is larger and closer to the EU effect. This strongly 
suggests that we are picking up the effect of the agreement and not general trends in the group. 
The results suggest that the boost in trade from joining the 1958 Agreement has been at least 20 
percent. But using the effects of the agreement to predict what would happen to the United States may 
be problematic because the United States is a relatively large exporter, accounting for 8 percent of 
auto exports on average to the sample group over the period. If small exporters are affected differently 
from large exporters then the results might not transfer. Indeed, a standard trade model would suggest 
larger effects on small exporters if the agreement is largely about fixed costs, as these producers can 
now access more markets. We next interact average market share over the period with the UN58 
effect. Average market share is defined as a country’s total exports of autos in a given year relative to 
the world total, averaged over the whole period. We use average market share because market share in 
any year is endogenous to the agreement. If the effect is larger for small exporters we expect the 
coefficient to be negative. Interacting market share with the UN58 dummy variable also enables us to 
estimate the effect on trade for a relatively large exporter like the United States. 
The results are reported in column 4. Larger exporters experience a smaller boost to exports from 
regulatory convergence, but the overall effect is still positive for all exporters. Figure 4 shows how the 
effect varies with average market share over the period. Exports of a country with a market share of 8 
percent like the United States would increase by about 35 percent with other countries that drive on 
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 Freund and Portugal-Perez (2013) find a 52 percent increase in imports associated with EU membership, while Baldwin 
and Taglioni (2006) find a smaller effect (27 percent) over the period 1980–2004. Using auto data over the same period 
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the right side of the road. The largest exporters, Germany and Japan, still receive a 7 percent boost 
from membership. 
The results above offer strong evidence that regulatory harmonization has strong positive effects on 
trade. We subject the results to further robustness tests, including more conservative treatment of 
errors, alternative time periods, controlling for trade policies, and a placebo test. All results remain 
robust.
12
 
Comparison with Other Estimates 
Using the 1958 Agreement as an example produces larger effects on trade than results based on tariff 
equivalents. Ecorys (2009) estimates trade gains associated with EU and US auto regulatory 
convergence of about 10 percent. After designing and collecting data from a business survey of 5,500 
NAFTA and EU member firms, Ecorys constructed an index ranking restrictiveness of nontariff 
regulations for bilateral trade between countries, ranging from 0 (completely open) to 100 (completely 
closed), for 23 sectors. The individual responses are aggregated by sector country-pair, and added to a 
gravity model, which predicts trade after controlling for GDP of trading partners and the distance 
between them, using data from 2008. The gravity model was run individually for each of the sectors to 
generate a set of tariff equivalents. In the auto sector, Ecorys finds a 25.5 percent increase in costs of 
US exports to the European Union, and a 26.8 increase in costs of EU exports to the United States. 
That is, they estimate that regulations affect trade in the same way as an ad valorem tariff of about 25 
percent. 
Using this tariff equivalent, Ecorys then uses computable general equilibrium (CGE) analysis to 
predict the medium-run increase in exports between the United States and European Union following a 
reduction in nontariff measures between the two countries through 2018. In an ambitious scenario, 
where all automotive regulations are eliminated, EU exports increase by 10.7 percent a year, while US 
exports increase 9.1 percent. A limited scenario, which sees only half of nontariff regulations 
eliminated, still has a positive impact on EU exports (4.3 percent increase per year) and US exports 
(5.3 percent per year).
 13
 Following the model, this export increase corresponds to an increase in sector 
output of 0.7 percent per year for the United States and a 2.2 percent increase for the European Union, 
which translates into an increase in national income of $2.1 billion and $15.6 billion for the two 
markets, respectively. In comparison, our model cannot be used like a CGE model to predict changes 
in output or income, but given the much larger export boost we estimate from regulatory convergence, 
the Ecorys’ predictions likely represent the minimum increases in output and income. Our estimates, 
which are based on an actual harmonization event, may be larger than theirs for a number of reasons. 
The most important are that (1) the restrictiveness index from survey evidence is likely to be very 
noisy and not necessarily linked to the production costs associated with regulatory differences. 
Perceived regulations may not affect trade in a monotonic way as their model assumes. For example, a 
small regulatory difference in one sector may affect production costs more than a large regulatory 
difference in another sector because of the production process. (2) Using a gravity equation to turn the 
survey into a tariff equivalent forces regulatory barriers to affect trade in a very restrictive way, as an 
iceberg cost that affects trade in the same way across sectors, when regulatory differences affect 
production structure, returns to scale, and variable and fixed costs.  
In contrast, our estimate is the long-run trade effect of harmonization, as estimated from an actual 
agreement. As these are historical effects, the actual effect could still differ if modern supply chains 
have reduced the importance of trade restrictions. The short- to medium-run effects might be 
significantly smaller if foreign investment has already adjusted to segment the US and EU markets. To 
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the extent these investments are irreversible in the short run, production will take some time to adjust 
to changes in the regulatory system. In light of this, the next section looks at production chains across 
markets and the trends in FDI in the auto sector between the United States and European Union.  
4. Foreign Direct Investment and Industry Trends 
FDI in both directions is substantial. FDI stocks between the United States and European Union in the 
transportation sector have steadily increased over time in both directions, with an increase in both US 
direct investment in the European Union and EU investment in the United States. In particular, 
European investment has increased in recent years, while US FDI stock in the European Union has 
declined since 2007 (figure 5). For European carmakers, particularly German firms Volkswagen and 
BMW, revenue from US sales has also steadily increased over the past 10 years (figure 6).  
US and European manufacturers use different supply chains for cars produced for the US 
consumer. The 1992 American Automotive Labeling Act (AALA) requires all automobiles sold in the 
United States to be labeled with the percent of US and Canadian content that makes up each type of 
automobile sold in the United States, in order to encourage US consumers to buy cars with high levels 
of US content. Figure 7 shows the average share of US and Canadian content of the “big three” US 
automakers (Chrysler, GM and Ford). In 2007, the big three produced car models that contained 70 
percent US or Canadian content on average. By 2015 models, that share had declined in all three 
companies, as production shifted to Mexico. So, while US carmakers’ production for US consumption 
has shifted away from the United States, there has been little movement outside NAFTA.  
The AALA data shows that compared with US or Japanese automobile manufacturers, European 
firms still tend to produce the majority of their parts in the European Union for cars sold in the United 
States. Table 5 compares the US content of the top 5 models sold in the United States in 2014, 
separated into US, EU, and other non-US manufacturers. Of the top 5 European cars sold, only 
Volkswagen has a significant share of its content from outside of Germany and produces cars for the 
US market in both Germany and Mexico. 
The high share of US content among Japanese firms relative to European carmakers is related to 
historical restrictions on Japanese car imports and a volatile yen. As trade tensions between Japan and 
the United States flared, the Japanese government agreed to VERs on the number of Japanese cars that 
could be exported to the United States, while European carmakers had no similar legislation in place. 
VERs were in effect from 1981 to 1994. Additionally, in 1985, the United States and Japan realigned 
exchange rates in the Plaza Accord. The significant appreciation of the yen removed the cost 
advantage of producing in Japan for export to the United States and led to a less stable yen/dollar 
exchange rate. The three biggest Japanese carmakers opened factories in the United States to get 
around VERs, (Honda in 1980, Nissan in 1983, and Toyota in 1986) and continued producing in the 
United States to some extent because of the exchange rate adjustment. In contrast, VW closed its only 
US plant in the United States in 1988 and did not open another US plant until 2011.
14 
Although the differences in regulations require separate car models for the US markets, European 
firms still choose to produce cars bound for the US market through EU supply chains perhaps because 
of fewer historical restrictions on trade (and indeed Korean-made cars also tend to have lower levels of 
US content than Japanese-made ones). If regulations were mutually recognized, preexisting supply 
chains, which currently produce two versions of the same model of cars sold in both markets, would 
become more efficient as they would be able to halve the number of different models they produce 
along these supply chains.  
                                                     
14
 Schaede (2010); James Healy, “‘Transplant’ Auto Factories in USA Turn 30 This Year,” USA Today, April 3, 2012; 
Andrew Pollack, “Japan to End Restraints on Auto Exports to US,” New York Times, March 29, 1994.  
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While European cars sold in the United States are largely European-made, what about US cars sold 
in Europe? The European Union does not have similar content-reporting regulations in place, making 
it difficult to determine precisely the European content of US branded cars sold in Europe. However, 
one way of determining if US auto firms are any more reliant on production in Europe than EU auto 
firms are on production in the United States is to compare sales of multinationals outside of their home 
countries, which is likely to move with foreign production, and exports. The higher the ratio of exports 
to sales, the more foreign affiliates rely on imports from the parent company for sales, rather than 
producing cars in the market they sell in.  
Table 6 uses US Bureau of Economic Analysis data on multinationals operating in the United 
States and US companies abroad to calculate the ratio of exports to sales in 2012, the most recent year 
for which data are available. These BEA data are for both US affiliates operating abroad and foreign 
affiliates operating in the United States and report total sales in transport equipment for both groups 
(NAICS 366). For European parents and their US affiliates, exports are of all transport equipment and 
wholesale trade in motor vehicles and motor vehicle parts and supplies. This matches closely data 
from Comtrade on transportation exports from the European Union to the United States. However, 
these data are not available for US parents and their European affiliates. To calculate the ratio of 
exports to sales in this case, we instead use Comtrade data on total EU-27 exports of transport 
equipment to the United States (SITC 73).  
Despite exports to total sales of just one-third of European sales, local content data reveal that 
European cars are still made of largely EU content. This may be because final assembly is often the 
most cost-effective stage of production to move. As a result these ratios may offer a good sense of 
relative differences across markets but may be less useful as an indication of home-country content. 
The ratio of exports to total sales is higher in Europe than in the United States. This suggests that 
US car sales in Europe have relatively higher levels of foreign content than European cars have non-
European content in the United States. The estimates from the model of large long-run trade gains 
from regulatory harmonization, significantly larger than from tariff reductions, therefore may be more 
delayed in the United States than Europe, because the United States produces vehicles in Europe with 
less US content compared with the EU content of European vehicles for the US market. European 
producers are therefore likely to adjust more rapidly to a new integrated terrain than US producers, 
where production is separated.  
Beyond the firms with production abroad, firms that do not currently export to the United States, 
such as French motor company Renault, could increase variety in the US market without incurring the 
costs associated with building cars to US specification. As noted earlier, the market for compact and 
subcompact cars in the United States is very small, but if firms that produce such vehicles following 
EU regulations can sell in North America, they will be able to reach the US and Canadian consumers 
who prefer smaller cars without incurring the high costs of modifying the car models. Since 
regulations provide similar levels of safety, and harmonized regulations bring trade gains, the United 
States and European Union should work towards making US and European cars available in both 
markets without having to make separate versions of each model.  
5. Policy Proposal 
Considering the large gains from harmonization, one proposal for the US and EU automotive sector is 
for the United States to join the 1958 Agreement. However, this approach has high logistic and legal 
costs. In addition to the technical differences in regulations, such as the turn signal light example in 
table 1, EU and US regulations on vehicle safety certification also differ in implementation. The 
United States operates under a self-certification system for vehicle regulations. The National Highway 
and Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) issues safety regulations for US vehicles, but calls on 
automakers to certify that their new vehicles conform to these safety regulations. Firms are responsible 
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for both testing of new vehicles and liable for any penalties associated with vehicles that are found not 
in compliance with NHTSA regulations. On the other hand, under the 1958 Agreement, the European 
Union operates under a type-approval system, where firms submit samples of new cars to government 
testing facilities, which formally approve these new models. Once approved by any government in the 
European Union, that car model is considered to have met the safety regulations of all EU members 
and can be sold in all EU countries (Canis and Lattanzio 2014).  
As demand for vehicles shifts away from the US market, there is less of an incentive to produce 
models specifically designed to meet US safety regulations and approval systems. However, 
logistically, it would likely be infeasible to switch from a self-certification to a type-approval system, 
as the United States would need to establish a new government entity to handle auto safety 
regulations, rewrite laws to regulate changes in liability for faulty vehicles and parts , and build new 
infrastructure for safety testing.  
An alternative approach would be to leave established regulatory systems in place in both the 
United States and the European Union but have both countries accept the other’s regulations as valid 
in their own market. Such a policy could be adopted either for all vehicle regulations or for a range of 
particular components. Currently, few cases of such mutual recognition are in place, but it is not 
without precedent, and this approach is gaining ground. New Zealand, which signed on to the 1958 
Agreement in 2002, also imports vehicles certified under US regulations.
15
 Mexico allows sales of 
vehicles with either Mexican or European certification.
16
 Additionally, free trade agreements have 
facilitated some of this mutual recognition. The Korea-US Free Trade Agreement allows Korea to 
import 25,000 vehicles per automaker that meet US regulations, without having to also meet Korean 
regulations (Schott 2010). Canada is moving toward mutual recognition of EU and US regulations. 
While Canadian regulations generally mirror US regulations, the Canada-European Union 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, signed in October 2014, lists 17 UNECE safety 
regulations that are considered an allowable alternative to current Canadian regulations (Foreign 
Affairs, Trade and Development Canada 2013). 
There is evidence that both the United States and the European Union would accept such of 
agreement. In September 2009, the European Communities brought a proposal to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) to supplement the existing text of the December 2008 Negotiating Group on 
Market Access, in order to reconcile type-approval (1958 Agreement) and self-certification (US 
regulations) frameworks in the auto industry.
17
 The proposal recognized both systems as valid auto 
regulatory frameworks and allows for three paths for potential signatories: (1) members with type-
approval systems already in place must sign the 1958 Agreement, (2) members with self-certification 
systems may join the 1958 Agreement, then nominate a national regulatory body to deliver type-
approval of automobiles produced in that member state, and (3) members with self-certification 
systems may maintain them while recognizing UN Regulations as equally valid as their own 
regulations in their market (Negotiating Group on Market Access 2009a).  
The proposal also presents a method for documenting member country adoptions of mutually 
recognized equivalent regulations for EU and US technical requirements. Each member is required to 
certify that it will accept a particular EU regulation as equivalent to a US regulation. For each 
requirement, the United States must document each safety requirement that is considered equivalent to 
the EU requirement in order for a car that meets either regulation to be sold. At the same time, the 
European Union must recognize that the same US regulation is equivalent to the EU regulation to sell 
a car that meets either requirement in the market.  
                                                     
15
 New Zealand Transport Agency, “Guide to importing a vehicle,” www.nzta.govt.nz/vehicle/importing.  
16
 Jeremy Cato, “Mexico accepts European vehicle standards, why doesn’t Canada?” Globe and Mail, November 5, 2014.  
17
 The 2008 negotiations provide a framework for proposing and adopting regulatory harmonization in the automotive 
sector but does not itself propose steps for convergence.  
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For example, the United States requires that the colors of the front and rear end-outline marker 
lamps be amber and red, respectively.
18
 The corresponding EU requirement is white and red, 
respectively. If both the United States and the European Union recognized each other’s regulations, 
firms from both countries would be able to sell cars with either type of lights in both markets and not 
have to change the colors.  
The US response to the WTO framework was positive. The United States circulated a response 
outlining a procedure for transparently reporting changes in regulation and conformity assessment 
procedures, noting transparency was particularly necessary when countries were adopting another 
member’s regulations. This communication also added that when members propose to adopt a 
technical regulation, they should also consider the costs of complying with this regulation and 
consider any already available alternatives that fulfil the same objective. A revised version of the 
proposal, circulated in December 2009, incorporated these US proposed changes (Negotiating Group 
on Market Access 2009b).  
While this proposal has not moved forward in the WTO, there is potential for a similar bilateral 
proposal of mutual recognition either within the TTIP framework or in an auto sector-specific 
agreement.  
From an economic perspective, assuming the safety and environmental outcomes of the regulations 
are the same, harmonization and mutual recognition have similar economic results. In both cases, 
inventory can be redeployed. In both cases, only one model needs to be created for both markets. In 
both cases, models with low demand in a foreign market can still be exported without costly 
adjustments. Mutual recognition will be much easier to achieve in this case, especially with respect to 
the approval system, because shifting from government to self-approval or vice versa would require 
the trade agreement to impinge on legal systems, which are part of national sovereignty. For members 
the main economic concern with mutual recognition is that if one system is significantly cheaper to 
use than the other, it could draw investment away from the region with the more costly regulation.  
Mutual recognition also has important implications for outside producers. If the agreement extends 
only to the European Union and the United States, outside producers will still be required to produce 
for two different systems. For example, if Korea-manufactured automobiles that meet EU regulations 
are not eligible for the mutual recognition agreement, then Korean producers will still be required to 
produce separate models for each market. This will put them at a cost disadvantage relative to US and 
EU producers. Not extending mutual recognition will also prevent the “global standard setting” that 
US and EU governments have used to motivate the agreement. It is therefore important that a mutual 
recognition agreement is extended to outside producers as well. Of course, they would not be 
permitted to follow their own unique regulations and be granted recognition privileges, but provided 
they adhere to either US or EU regulations, automobiles produced outside the TTIP area should be 
subject to the same restrictions as US- or EU-produced vehicles.  
Mutual recognition, particularly with enhanced technical harmonization, would require time to 
achieve. Kenneth Feith, Daniel Malone, and John Creamer (2014) offer a starting point of trust and 
cooperation, where US and EU regulators considering new technologies keep each other informed and 
work together on the rulemaking process and commit to bridging the type-approval and self-
certification systems, and build in steps towards mutual recognition. 
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 Outline marker lamps are placed on the front and rear of the vehicle to indicate the overall width of the vehicle.  
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6. Conclusion 
Regulatory convergence or mutual recognition of regulations between the European Union and the 
United States would bring larger welfare gains than tariff reduction. The gains are in efficiency, 
variety, and innovation. We estimate that harmonization of auto regulations would increase US-EU 
auto trade by at least 20 percent. These gains can be achieved through the TTIP, which also aims at 
setting rules for global trade. To maximize auto market integration, greater harmonization would be 
preferable, with the United States becoming a contracting member of the 1958 Agreement. However, 
recognizing differences in legal systems and approval systems implies that the greatest benefit at the 
least cost is likely to come from the harmonization of technical regulations, where overlap already 
exists, and the mutual recognition of regulations and approval methods across countries. This 
approach allows firms to streamline production and offers increased variety for consumers without 
implicitly favoring either the existing EU or US systems. We also recommend that outside producers 
are extended the same treatment, provided they adhere to the US or EU system.  
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1 Differences in regulations between EU and US side turn-signal lamps 
Current EU regulations and US end-outline marker lamps [clearance lamps] (R48: UN Regulation No. 48; F108: 
FMVSS Standard No. 108; R7: UN Regulation No. 7; SAE Standard No. J2042) 
Property EU (UN Regulations)* 
US (FMVSS/SAE 
Standards)§ Comparison 
Applicability  Optional, option of 
AM/RM1/RM2 
category lamps 
Optional Identical for applicability The 
EU permits the use of variable 
intensity rear end outline marker 
lamps, while the US prohibits 
their use 
Number 4–8 2x Front 
2x Rear 
Number of side marker lamps 
can range from 4–8 in the EU, 
but must be 4 (2x rear and 2x 
front) in the US 
Color Front: White  
Rear: Red 
Front: Amber 
Rear: Red 
Color must be white at the front 
and red at the rear in the EU, 
while the color must be amber at 
the front and red at the rear in 
the US 
Position 
Height Front: Upper edge not 
lower than upper edge of 
wind-screen Rear: At 
maximum height possible  
As near the top as 
practicable  
Minimum height at front is 
lower in the EU Identical for the 
rear 
Width Outer: ≤400 mm and as 
close as possible to the 
extreme outer edge of the 
vehicle  
Indicate the overall width 
of the vehicle and 
symmetric about the 
vertical center line 
Widths are more prescriptive in 
the EU, while the US is more 
subjective  
Length — Front: On the front Rear: 
On the rear Other: Any 
other location to ensure 
that overall width of 
vehicle is indicated 
Lengths are not defined in the 
EU, while the US provides 
subjective length definitions  
Other Distances must be ≥200 
mm vertically from 
position lamps 
— Minimum vertical distance from 
position lamps are prescribed in 
the EU, while the US does not 
define these minimum distances 
Geometric visibility H: O80° V: D20° to U5° — Geometric visibility ranges are 
prescribed in the EU, while the 
US does not define geometric 
visibility ranges 
Photometric H: 0° to O20° V: D10° to H: I45° to O45°† V:  Smaller horizontal and upward 
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visibility U5° D10°
$
 to U10° photometric visibility angles 
required in the EU 
Photometric 
Minima∆ 
≥4 cd @ H: 0°,  
V: 0°  
≥0.4 cd @ H: O20°,  
V: D/U 5°  
Front: ≥0.62 cd Rear: 
≥0.25 cd 
 Photometric minima are greater 
in the reference axis for all 
lamps in the EU Absolute 
photometric minima for all 
lamps in the EU are smaller than 
photometric minima for front 
end-outline marker lamps and 
greater than photometric minima 
for rear end-outline marker 
lamps 
Photometric 
Maxima∆ 
AM: ≥140 cd @ H: 0°, V: 
0° ≥14 cd @ H: O20°, V: 
D/U 5° RM1: ≥17 cd @ 
H: 0°, V: 0° ≥1.7 cd @ H: 
O20°, V: D/U 5° RM2: 
≥42 cd @ H: 0°, V: 0° 
≥4.2 cd @ H: O20°, V: 
D/U 5°  
Front: - Rear: ≥15 cd Front photometric maxima are 
prescribed in the EU, while the 
US does not define front 
photometric maxima Rear 
photometric maxima are greater 
in the reference axis for all 
lamps in the EU Absolute rear 
photometric minima for all 
lamps in the EU are smaller than 
photometric minima for rear 
end-outline marker lamps 
* Applicable for vehicles that are between 1.8–2.1 m in length  
§ Applicable for vehicles that are ≤2302 mm in width  
† May be reduced to D0° when lamp is mounted at locations other than the front or rear 
$ May be reduced to D5° when lamp is mounted below 750 mm  
∆ UN: for single function lamps tested at voltage supplies of 6.75v, 13.5v and 28v; US: for non-reflecting single 
function lamps with photometric measurements made at ≥1.2m 
Directional nomenclature: I, inboard; O, outboard; D, downward; U, upward; B, backward; F, forward; L, left; 
R, right. Applicable for right hand traffic lamps only, reverse left and right directions for left hand traffic lamps. 
H, horizontal (longitudinal) plane about a polar axis in a spherical coordinate system centered on the 
illuminating surface of the lamp; V, vertical (latitudinal) plane perpendicular to a polar axis in a spherical 
coordinate system centered on the illuminating surface of the lamp 
Source: European Commission (2015, table 33). 
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Table 2 Fatalities US versus EU regression results 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Fatality rate 
per 100,000 
vehicles 
Fatality rate 
per 100,000 
vehicles ln fatality rate 
EU dummy 2.192 
[2.393] 
–0.190 
[1.609] 
–0.156 
[0.102] 
ln GDP per 
capita 
 –22.673*** 
[4.020] 
–1.373*** 
[0.217] 
Observations 78 78 78 
R-squared 0.017 0.554 0.544 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Sources: World Health Organization Global Health 
Observatory Data Repository, 2010, 
http://apps.who.int/gho/data/node.main.A997; authors’ 
calculations using data from US National Highway and Traffic 
Safety Administration, 2012 FARS database, 
www.nhtsa.gov/FARS, and US Census Bureau, 2012, 
www.census.gov/popest/data/historical/2010s/index.html.  
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Table 3 Members of the 1958 Agreement (as of February2014) 
Country 
Date of 
accession Country 
Date of 
accession 
Belgium 1959 Estonia 1995 
France 1959 Belarus 1995 
Sweden 1959 Turkey 1996 
Hungary 1960 Ireland 1998 
Netherlands 1960 European Union 1998 
Spain 1961 Japan 1998 
United Kingdom 1963 Latvia 1999 
Italy 1963 Bulgaria 2000 
Germany 1966 Australia 2000 
Austria 1971 Ukraine 2000 
Luxembourg 1971 Serbia 2001 
Switzerland 1973 South Africa 2001 
Norway 1975 Azerbaijan 2002 
Finland 1976 New Zealand 2002 
Denmark 1976 Lithuania 2002 
Romania 1977 Cyprus 2004 
Poland 1979 Malta 2004 
Portugal 1980 South Korea 2004 
Russia 1987 Thailand 2006 
Croatia 1991 Montenegro 2006 
Macedonia 1991 Malaysia 2006 
Slovenia 1991 Tunisia 2008 
Greece 1992 Albania 2011 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
1992 Kazakhstan 2011 
Czech Republic 1993 Egypt 2013 
Slovakia 1993   
Source: UN Economic Commission for Europe, 
www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/trans/main/wp29/wp29regs/up
dates/ECE-TRANS-WP.29-343-Rev.22.pdf. 
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Table 4 Effect of the 1958 Agreement on auto trade 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable: ln(exportsij)    
UN58 0.205* 
[0.118] 
0.197* 
[0.118] 
0.388*** 
[0.138] 
0.456*** 
[0.148] 
0.448*** 
[0.148] 
EU  0.662*** 
[0.134] 
0.626*** 
[0.134] 
0.613*** 
[0.134] 
0.691*** 
[0.154] 
Left-
Right*UN58 
  –0.393** 
[0.156] 
–0.368** 
[0.156] 
–0.368** 
[0.156] 
Share*UN58    –1.737* 
[0.977] 
–1.663* 
[0.982] 
Share*EU     –2.238* 
[1.296] 
Observations 50,467 50,467 50,467 50,467 50,467 
R-squared 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 
Trade effect 
(percent) 
23 22 47 58 57 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets clustered at the exporter-importer level. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 5 US content of top-selling US, EU, and other non-US car models, 2014 
Model Models sold  
Percent 
US/Canadian 
content 
Percent other 
contenta 
Final 
assembly 
location(s) 
Engine 
source(s) 
Transmission 
source(s) 
United States 
Ford F-Series 753,851 75  USA USA USA 
Chevrolet 
Silverado 
529,755 40 51, Mexico USA, Mexico USA USA 
Dodge Ram 1500-
3500 
439,789 66 23, Mexico USA, Mexico Mexico, Italy USA 
Ford Fusion 306,860 75 15, Mexico Mexico Romania, UK, 
Spain, 
Mexico 
USA, UK 
Ford Escape 306,212 60  USA Mexico, 
Spain, UK 
USA 
Europe 
Volkswagen Jetta  141,354 6–12 37-41, 
Mexico, up to 
26, Germany 
Mexico Mexico Japan, 
Argentina, 
Germany 
BMW 3 Series  100,902 5 60-65, 
Germany 
Germany Germany Germany 
Passat Volkswagen 96,649 40–45 21, Mexico; 
26-41, 
Germany 
USA Germany, 
Mexico 
Germany, 
Argentina, 
Japan 
Mercedes-Benz 
“C” Class 
75,066 0 73, Germany Germany Germany Germany 
Mercedes-Benz 
“E” Class 
66,403 0 73, Germany Germany Germany Germany 
Other non-US 
Toyota Camry 428,606 75 20, Japan USA USA, Japan USA, Japan 
Honda Accord 388,374 70 15, Japan USA USA, Japan USA, Japan 
Toyota Corolla 339,498 60 30, Japan China, USA USA Japan 
Nissan Altima 335,644 60 15, Japan USA USA Japan 
Honda Cr-V 335,019 70 15, Japan USA, China, 
Mexico 
USA USA, Japan 
a. To be included in the other content category, an individual country must produce at least 15 percent of the parts 
included in the car model. 
Sources: 1992 American Automotive Labeling Act, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 
http://www.nhtsa.gov/Laws+&+Regulations/Part+583+American+Automobile+Labeling+Act+(AALA)+Reports; 
Bloomberg, www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2015-auto-sales. 
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Table 6 Ratio of exports to total sales, 2012 
 
Exports by parent to 
affiliate company 
(millions of US 
dollars)  
Total sales by affiliate  
(millions of US 
dollars) Exports/total sales 
All transportation equipment  
European 
parent, US 
affiliate 
56,860 165,066 0.34 
US parent, 
European 
affiliate 
28,837
a
 166,788 0.17 
a. Total EU imports of transportation equipment from the United States (SITC code 73). 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from Bureau of Economic Analysis and UN 
Comtrade Database. 
Appendix table A.1 List of exporters 
Argentina United Kingdom 
Belgium India 
Belgium-
Luxembourg 
Italy 
Brazil Japan 
Canada South Korea 
China Mexico 
Germany Netherlands 
Spain Portugal 
France Thailand 
United States Finland 
Australia Hungary 
Romania Morocco 
Austria Poland 
Sweden Russia 
South Africa Serbia/Montenegro 
Indonesia Slovak Republic 
Turkey Slovenia 
Czech Republic  
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Figure 1 Auto fatalities per 100,000 vehicles, United States and European Union, 2013 
a. Fatalities in the United States 
 
b. Fatalities in the European Union 
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22 
c. Fatality rates and GDP per capita in individual EU countries and US states 
 
Sources: World Health Organization Global Health Observatory Data Repository, 2010, http://apps.who.int/gho/data/node.main.A997; authors' calculations 
using data from US National Highway and Traffic Safety Administration, 2012, FARS database, www.nhtsa.gov/FARS, and US Census Bureau, 2012, 
www.census.gov/popest/data/historical/2010s/index.html. 
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Figure 2 Export expansion relative to accession to 1958 Agreement 
 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
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Figure 3 Export share to 1958 Agreement members relative to accession year 
 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
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Figure 4 Trade effect by average market share 
 
Source: Authors’ Calculations 
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Figure 5 Foreign direct investment position in transportation equipment, 1982-2013 
 
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis, International Data, Direct Investment and MNE, www.bea.gov. 
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Figure 6 EU manufacturers' revenue from US operations, 2004-2013 
 
Source: Bloomberg. 
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Figure 7 Average share of US and Canadian content, by company, 2007-2015 models  
 
*Chrysler 2015 average includes Fiat models, following the merging of the two companies in 2014. 
Source: Data from the 1992 American Automotive Labeling Act. 
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